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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1]  Corporate America’s increasing dependence on the electronic use of 
personally identifiable information (“PII”)1 necessitates a reexamination 
and expansion of the traditional conception of corporate assets.  PII is now 
a commodity that companies trade and sell.2  As technological 
                                                 
∗ Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.  B.A., Augustana 
College, 1970; M.A., Economics, University of Illinois, 1973; J.D., University of Illinois, 
1973; Ph.D., Economics, University of Illinois, 1975.  Executive Director, Privacy 
Foundation. 
∗∗ B.A., North Carolina State University; J.D. Candidate, 2009, University of Denver 
Sturm College of Law. 
∗∗∗ Associate, Townsend and Townsend and Crew, LLP; B.S., University of Wisconsin-
Madison, 2000; J.D., University of Denver Sturm College of Law, 2007. 
1 The precise definition of personally identifiable information varies depending upon 
context.  “Personal information” typically encompasses a wide variety of identifiable 
traits: first and last name, past and present addresses, e-mail addresses, telephone 
numbers, social security number, gender, birth date, household income, financial and 
credit account data, medical information, and purchasing history.  See Will Thomas 
DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 283, 298 
(2003). 
2 See Corey Ciocchetti, The Privacy Matrix, 12 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 245, 247 
(2007)[hereinafter Ciocchetti, The Privacy Matrix]; Mark F. Kightlinger, The Gathering 
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development increases, aspects of day-to-day business involving PII are 
performed electronically in a more cost effective and efficient manner.3  
PII, which companies obtain at little cost, has quantifiable value that is 
rapidly reaching a level comparable to the value of traditional financial 
assets.4 
 
[2]  There is a catch, however: companies benefiting from the value of PII 
bear the burden of protecting the privacy interests attached to PII.5  In light 
of technological advancement, which often threatens the security of 
sensitive information,6 privacy ranks among the most important issues 
facing modern society.7  And for good reason, the consumer privacy 
interest in PII is in a precarious state.  Absent adequate safeguards, the 
building blocks of an individual’s virtual identity become increasingly 
more vulnerable each time the information changes hands.8  This reality is 
not lost on American consumers, who are becoming more aware of 
privacy threats and more skeptical of current levels of privacy safety.9 
 
                                                                                                                         
Twilight? Information Privacy on the Internet in the Post-Enlightenment Era, 24 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 353, 384 (2006). 
3 See Jessica M. Lewis, HIPAA: Demystifying the Implications for Financial Institutions, 
8 N.C. BANKING INST. 141, 141 (2004). 
4 See DeVries, supra note 1 at 298.  (“[I]nstitutions have gradually realized that they sit 
atop a horde of digital gold: their customers’ personal information.”).  Id.  
5 It is important to draw the distinction between privacy and PII from the outset.  This 
article suggests that PII has demonstrable value.  Individuals and companies can, among 
other things, trade, sell, combine and analyze PII.  The individual to whom the PII 
pertains has a privacy interest in the information, specifically the right to control access 
to their information.  The value of privacy is difficult to ascertain. 
6 See Janice A. Alwin, Privacy Planning: Putting the Privacy Statutes To Work for You, 
14 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 353, 353 (2002); Haeji Hong, Dismantling the Private Enforcement 
of the Privacy Act of 1974: Doe v. Chao, 38 AKRON L. REV. 71, 71 (2005). 
7 Kent Walker, Where Everybody Knows Your Name: A Pragmatic Look at the Costs of 
Privacy and the Benefits of Information Exchange, 2000 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, ¶ 1 
(citing CHARLES J. SYKES, THE END OF PRIVACY 221 (1999)). 
8 See Edmund Mierzwinski, Privacy Information Sharing and the Boundaries of Each, B-
1473 PLI/CORP. 57, 83 (2005). 
9 Vera Bergelson, It’s Personal but Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in Personal 
Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379, 428-29 & n.260. 
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[3]  While corporate executives are beginning to realize the importance of 
data security,10 the steady rise of data breaches11 suggests that the groups 
making internal policy decisions for many of America’s companies have 
yet to grasp or accept a fundamental reality of the modern business 
world.12  In order to continue benefiting from the ever-increasing value of 
PII as an asset, corporate America’s leaders must recognize and protect the 
value of their customers’ PII privacy interests in a manner similar to the 
way they treat and protect financial assets.13  If companies fail to protect 
this valuable interest, the backlash from disgruntled consumers and their 
elected representatives will threaten the access to and use of PII. 
 
[4]  Part II of this article explains the basics of privacy, including the 
definition of informational privacy and the impact of technology.  Part III 
reviews the value of PII to American companies.  Part VI assesses the 
magnitude of the threat to PII, as well as common sources that threaten PII 
security.  Part V covers the most important federal and state privacy 
regulations in the United States.  Part VI analyzes the causes and effects of 
consumer discontent.  Part VII broadly discusses the effects of PII 
breaches and resulting litigation.  Finally, Part VIII makes the case that 
directors and executives must acknowledge that protection of the privacy 
interest in PII is now a part of business that must be taken seriously. 
                                                 
10 Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Extending Learned Hand’s Negligence 
Formula to Information Security Breaches, 3 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 237, 238 
(2007) (referencing survey of crisis management concerns of corporate executives). 
11 Thomas Claburn, Record Number of Data Breaches Reported in 2007, INFO.WEEK, 
Dec. 31, 2007, 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/internet/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=205206089 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2009) [hereinafter Claburn, Record Number of Data Breaches] 
(reviewing the increase in data breaches from 2006 to 2007). 
12 This contention is by no means novel.  Commentaries on this general problem, in 
varying contexts, can be found in the academic literature.  See generally Mark F. Foley, 
Board Oversight of Information Technology, Data Privacy, and Data Security: 
Preserving Critical Business Assets, 80 WIS. LAW. 17, 17 (2007) (offering an expanded 
analysis of the problem in the specific context of electronic PII). 
13 Jeffrey Taft, Privacy and Data Security in Service Provider Arrangements: Recent 
Developments, 935 PLI/PAT. 485, 491 (2008). 
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II.  PRIVACY BASICS 
 
[5]  To understand the imperative of corporate America to provide for the 
adequate protection of the privacy interest individuals have in their PII, it 
is necessary to briefly review the traditional views of privacy and the 
effect of technology in expanding these views.  The evolution of the 
privacy concept places corporate America in a new and unique position as 
the steward of consumers’ virtual identities. 
 
A.  A HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF PRIVACY 
 
[6]  While privacy has many faces, the general concept of privacy has 
existed throughout civilization in diverse cultures.14  In the American legal 
community, the right to privacy first found expression as the right against 
intrusion.15  While earlier sources express this concept of privacy in 
varying contexts, the “right to be let alone” entered the American 
jurisprudential lexicon through the seminal work of Samuel Warren and 
Justice Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy.16  Although their article 
                                                 
14 Early expressions of the right to privacy are identifiable in Sumerian, Babylonian, 
Judeo-Christian, and Indian writings.  See, e.g., Janet Dean Gertz, Comment, The 
Purloined Personality: Consumer Profiling in Financial Services, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
943, 968 (2002) (discussing aspects of privacy in Mosaic law); see also Michael D. 
Roundy, Note, The Wiretap Act—Reconcilable Differences: A Framework for 
Determining the “Interception” of Electronic Communications Following United States 
v. Councilman’s Rejection of the Storage/Transit Dichotomy, 28 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 
403, 405 (2006) (discussing privacy aspects in the Code of Hammurabi). 
15 One of the earliest expressions of the right to privacy in American jurisprudence was 
echoed in Wheaton v. Peters, in which the United States Supreme Court stated 
“defendant asks nothing—wants nothing, but to be let alone until it can be shown that he 
has violated the rights of another.”  Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 634 (1834).  Another 
early expression of the “right to be let alone” is found in T.M. Cooley’s work.  THOMAS 
COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 389 (rev. students’ ed. 1930) (“The new right 
was conceived of as a right to be let alone—to be free from intrusions into one’s own 
private affairs and from unauthorized publicity concerning one’s personal and private 
affairs.”) 
16 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
193 (1890): 
Gradually the scope of these legal rights broadened; and now the right 
to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life, -- the right to be let 
alone; the right to liberty secures the exercise of extensive civil 
privileges; and the term ‘property’ has grown to comprise every form 
of possession -- intangible, as well as tangible. 
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examined privacy through the lens of tort theory, Brandeis later extended 
the concept into the constitutional sphere in his dissent in Olmstead v. 
United States.17  Unlike numerous state constitutions, the United States 
Constitution does not contain an explicit reference to privacy.18  It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the recognition of privacy as a constitutional 
right by a United States Supreme Court majority opinion did not appear 
until the mid-1960s.19  In Griswold v. Connecticut,20 the Court found that 
the penumbras of the guarantees in the Bill of Rights create zones of 
privacy.21  While the methodology of the Court in Griswold has been 
subject to intense criticism,22 the conclusion that the Constitution protects 
the right to privacy was groundbreaking and established a basis for 
extending the right in other contexts.23  Our traditional view of privacy is 
premised on the autonomy of the individual and the idea that people 
should be free from intrusions into their personal lives. 
 
B.  RECONCILING PRIVACY WITH TECHNOLOGY 
 
[7]  Three major technological developments are transforming our view of 
privacy: (1) the increase in data creation archiving vast amounts of 
                                                                                                                         
Id. at 193 (emphasis added).  
17 277 U.S. 438 (1928).  In his dissent in Olmstead, Justice Brandeis asserted that the 
founding fathers “conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the 
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”  Id. at 478 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  Interestingly, a majority of the Supreme 
Court of Georgia recognized the right to privacy under the Georgia Constitution ten years 
before Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead.  See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. 
Co., 122 Ga. 190, 197 50 S.E. 68, 71 (Ga. 1905). 
18 For example, Florida’s Constitution states, “[e]very natural person has the right to be 
let alone and free from governmental intrusion into [his] private life except as otherwise 
provided herein.”  E.g. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23. 
19 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 515-16 (1965) (holding that a state statute 
forbidding the use of contraceptives in the marital context violates the right of marital 
privacy); see also Hong, supra note 6, at 76 (stating the Court has upheld the right of 
privacy as a constitutionally protected right in several cases). 
20 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
21 See id. at 484. 
22 Interestingly, Justice Hugo Black, perhaps the most influential civil libertarian to sit on 
the Court, adamantly disagreed with the view that the Constitution protects privacy.  See 
ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 556-59 (2d ed. 1997). 
23 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (extending the right to privacy in the 
abortion context). 
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personal data; (2) the globalization of data collection and examination; and 
(3) the lack of adequate control mechanisms for digital information.24  Due 
to these developments, the privacy discourse has largely shifted its focus 
to the right to “informational privacy.”25  Informational privacy is the 
“claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves 
when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated 
to others.”26 
 
[8]  Informational privacy does not fully equate to the traditional precept 
of the “right to be let alone.”27  Informational privacy is broader, and more 
complex, because it reaches beyond the immediate person and into the 
stream of virtual commerce.  Thus, the concept of the “self” in the privacy 
context is gaining a new and exceedingly more complex meaning.28  The 
privacy discourse must now account for cyber or virtual personhood and 
the new privacy interests this manifestation creates.29  It is this virtual 
personality, often voluntarily introduced into virtual commerce by a real 
person, that individuals now seek to protect from intrusion.30   
 
[9]  The idea of virtual personality adds a significant third player to 
privacy security: the data collector and holder.31  Companies are in the 
best, and often times only, position to protect PII and the privacy interest 
                                                 
24 DeVries, supra note 1, at 291. 
25 Judith DeCew, Privacy, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Sept. 18, 2006, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/ entries/privacy/#InfPri (last visted Mar. 31, 2009); DeVries, 
supra note 1, at 288-91. 
26 Walker, supra note 7, ¶ 6 (quoting ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 
(1967)).  
27 Walker, supra note 7, ¶ 5.  In fact, “[j]urisprudence has drawn a ‘firm line’ between 
‘substantive’ ideas of privacy relating to issues affecting personhood and informational 
ones . . . .”  Jonathon W. Penney, Privacy and the New Virtualism, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 
194, 240 (2007) (quoting Sonia K. Katyal, The New Surveillance, 54 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 297, 308 (2004)). 
28 See COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY: POLICY 
INSTRUMENTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 22 (2003) (discussing the virtual self in the 
context of Foucalt’s notion of panopticon) 
29 See generally Penney, supra note 27, at 216-29 (discussing personhood in cyberspace). 
30 See id. at 225-28. 
31 See Walker, supra note 7, ¶ 40. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology  Volume XV, Issue 4 
 
7 
of the individual to whom the information belongs. 32  Because of this 
unique position, and the extremely difficult task of identifying and 
capturing identity thieves,33 companies that deal in PII are becoming 
increasingly more responsible for the protection of PII.34  Liability for 
failing to protect PII from data thieves is a real and present danger for 
these companies; liability which will increase steadily with the growth of 
the threat.   
 
III.  THE VALUE AND NECESSITY OF ELECTRONIC PII FOR CORPORATE 
AMERICA 
 
A.  NECESSITY 
 
[10]  For many companies, the use of paper records has become 
obsolete.35  As technology has advanced, corporate America has become 
dependent upon the electronic storage, transmission, and management of 
PII.36  Electronic management of PII is simply faster, cheaper, and easier.  
The difference in cost between paper and electronic insurance claim 
processing illustrates the enormous savings the electronic alternative 
                                                 
32 Joshua R. Levenson, Note, Strength in Numbers: An Examination into the Liability of 
Corporate Entities for Consumer and Employee Data Breaches, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 95, 96 (2008). 
33 The chances of a criminal being caught by federal enforces is one in 700.  Chris Jay 
Hoofnagle, Identity Theft: Making the Known Unknowns Known, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
97, 107-08 (2007) (citing AVIVAH LITAN, GARTNER, INC., UNDERREPORTING OF IDENTITY 
THEFT REWARDS THE THIEVES 1 (2003), 
http:www.gartner.com/gartner/images/116066.pdf).  Obviously, if the resources of the 
federal government are incapable of successfully tracking down identity thieves, the 
chances of success for a private plaintiff are exceedingly small. 
34 It is important to point out that a company’s duty to protect is not limited to guarding 
against hackers or stolen laptops.  As evidenced by the FTC’s treatment of ChoicePoint, 
discussed infra Part VI.B.1, companies are responsible for assuring that the entities with 
which they do business are legitimate. 
35 See Foley, supra note 12, at 17-18 (discussing business transitions with reference to 
technology). 
36 See Yves Allain, The New European Directives on Public Procurement: Change or 
Continuity?, 35 PUB. CONT. L.J. 517, 522 (2006); Thomas J. Manley & Scott M. Hobby, 
Globalization of Work: Offshore Outsourcing in the IT Age, 18 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 
401, 402 (2004); The Sedona Conference, Best Practices Commentary on the Use of 
Search and Information Retrieval Methods in E-Discovery, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 189, 192 
(2007) [hereinafter The Sedona Conference’s Best Practices Commentary]. 
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provides.37  As one commentator points out, the cost of processing an 
electronic claim is $0.25 to $0.75—a fraction of the $2 to $12 cost of 
processing the same claim using paper.38  Managing PII electronically also 
provides companies with a cost effective outsourcing option, which would 
be inconceivable if paper were the primary mode of data transfer.39 
 
[11]  Companies save substantial cost, time, and resources by using 
electronic data storage instead of physical storage.40  In the past, 
companies filed information in bankers’ boxes, and then stored the boxes 
in a warehouse, which might not have been close to a company’s office.41  
Today, companies are able to keep the same information in the company’s 
office by storing it electronically on hard drives or other data storage 
devices.42  Information that once may have taken days to locate is now 
available instantaneously.43  Electronic data storage has also cut the costs 
of physical transportation and rental space.44  In addition to these savings, 
the cost of electronic storage continues to plummet.45 
 
B.  THE VALUE OF PII 
 
[12]  PII is an exceptional resource that companies can use for internal 
marketing purposes or to sell to other companies.46  For example, the data 
points identifying an individual’s name and gender would be of little value 
to the marketing director of a Big & Tall store.  But combining that 
information with weight and height data points would be very valuable to 
the same marketing director.  When a company can identify consumers in 
its target demographic, its marketing department can efficiently direct 
advertising resources to that demographic by excluding consumers that 
                                                 
37 See Lewis, supra note 3, at 141. 
38 Id. 
39 See Manley & Hobby, supra note 36, at 402. 
40 See The Sedona Conference’s Best Practices Commentary, supra note 36, at 192. 
41 See id. 
42 Id. 
43 See Manley & Hobby, supra note 36, at 402. 
44 See The Sedona Conference’s Best Practices Commentary, supra note 36, at 192. 
45 James X. Dempsey, Digital Search & Seizure: Updating Privacy Protections to Keep 
Pace with Technology, 935 PLI/PAT. 543, 548 (2008).  From 1990 to 2007, the storage 
cost for a typical gigabyte fell from $20,000 to less than $1.  The Sedona Conference’s 
Best Practices Commentary, supra note 33, at 192. 
46 See Ciocchetti, The Privacy Matrix, supra note 2, at 253. 
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would likely have no interest in the company’s product.47  Here, the 
benefit to a company using PII is twofold: it raises the probability that 
advertising will translate into sales, and it cuts the expense of advertising 
to uninterested consumers.48 
 
[13]  Another legitimate use of PII enables companies to attract new 
customers and retain existing customers by offering them the benefits of 
personalized advertising.49  And maintaining consumers’ personal 
information “can help both companies and consumers, allowing for more 
tailored customer service without requiring customers to provide the same 
information repeatedly.”50  Thus, consumers also benefit from the 
transparent collection of their personal information.51   
 
[14]  Due, in part, to the use of PII in marketing decisions, commentators 
are conceptualizing PII as a commodity.52  Individual data points have 
concrete value,53 which can be traded on what is becoming a burgeoning 
                                                 
47 Corey Ciocchetti, Just Click Submit: The Collection, Dissemination, and Tagging of 
Personally Identifying Information, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 553, 578-79 (2008) 
[hereinafter Ciocchett, Just Click Submit]. 
48 See Tal Z. Zarsky, Desperately Seeking Solutions: Using Implementation-Based 
Solutions for the Troubles of Information Privacy in the Age of Data Mining and the 
Internet Society, 56 ME. L. REV. 13, 37 (2004). 
49 See Ciocchetti, Just Click Submit, supra note 47, at 578-79. (alerting consumers when 
their favorite product on sale). 
50 Gregory T. Parks & Megan E. Adams, Can Your Firm Be Sued for a Data Breach?, E-
COMMERCE TIMES, Dec. 8, 2006, 
http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/6zyeqfIOat4KEK/Can-Your-Firm-Be-Sued-for-
a-Data-Breach.xhtml (last visited Mar. 31, 2009). 
51 See Zarsky, supra note 48, at 36-37. 
52 See Horace E. Anderson, The Privacy Gambit: Toward a Game Theoretic Approach to 
International Data Protection, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 5 (2006); Grayson Barber, 
Personal Information in Government Records: Protecting the Public Interest in Privacy, 
25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 63, 96 (2006); Ciocchetti, The Privacy Matrix, supra note 2, 
at 247; Mark F. Kightlinger, Twilight of the Idols? EU Internet Privacy and the Post 
Enlightenment Paradigm, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1, 39 (2007); Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, 
Beyond Copyright: Managing Information Rights with DRM, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 181, 
195 (2006). 
53 In 2006, one commentator stated that “a consumer’s address can be purchased for 50 
cents, an unpublished number for $17.50, a Social Security number for a mere $8, and so 
on.”  Luis Salazar, Part I: Technology Explosion Creates Personal Privacy Tensions, 25 
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18, 18 (2006).  Commenting on the value of information, one 
commentator has noted, “Even in the manufacturing sectors, the processing of 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology  Volume XV, Issue 4 
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market for PII.54  The value of the data increases when combined to 
provide information, such as consumer preferences that are not discernable 
from the data points individually.55  As a result, companies are 
maintaining, sharing, and selling dossiers of millions of consumer 
preferences.56  And as marketing departments become more cognizant of 
the value of processed information that reveals consumer preferences, the 
value of this information, along with the PII market, will continue to grow. 
 
[15]  PII, if used properly, can generate legitimate profits that require very 
little input.  Further, the ability to maintain PII eliminates the necessity of 
purchasing PII from another source.  But the freedom with which 
companies currently use PII, and the benefits deriving from such use, is 
contingent upon the continued acquiescence of consumers and their 
elected representatives.  The potential for increased profits and cost 
savings serve as a substantial impetus for companies to ensure their 
actions do not compromise access to this valuable resource. 
 
VI.  THE THREAT TO PII 
 
A.  THE INCIDENCE OF LARGE SCALE DATA BREACH 
 
[16]  The incidence of large data breach is growing at a staggering pace.  
In 2005, 130 data breaches were reported.57  This number rose to 315 in 
2006, and again to 443 in 2007—an increase of over forty percent in one 
year.58  Since 2005, data breaches have compromised over 216 million 
                                                                                                                         
information about the goods sold, and about those who purchase and use them, is as 
important as the production and shipping of the goods themselves.”  Anderson, supra 
note 52, at 4. 
54 The market for personal information is $1.5 billion annually.  Christopher F. Carlton, 
The Right to Privacy in Internet Commerce: A Call for New Federal Guidelines and the 
Creation of an Independent Privacy Commission, 16 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 
393, 405 (2002); Kightlinger, supra note 52, at 39. 
55 See Zarsky, supra note 48, at 37. 
56 Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against 
Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 970 (2003).  
57 Derek A. Bishop, To Serve and Protect: Do Businesses Have a Legal Duty to Protect 
Collections of Personal Information?, 3 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 7 (2006) (citing Jon 
Swartz, 2005 Worst Year for Breaches of Computer Security, USA TODAY, Dec. 29, 
2005, at 1B). 
58 Claburn, Record Number of Data Breaches, supra note 11. 
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customer records.59  In a recent survey of more than 800 privacy 
professionals, eighty-five percent acknowledged at least one data breach 
occurred at their company in the past year.60  Of those same professionals, 
sixty-three percent acknowledged multiple data breaches over the same 
period.61  The statistics for data breaches that translate into actual identity 
fraud is also a significant concern.  From 2005 to 2006, approximately 
fifteen million Americans fell victim to identity fraud.62  Perhaps of equal 
importance, the number of fraud cases during this period rose over fifty 
percent from the number of cases in 2003.63 
 
[17]  In the past three years, entities that have suffered a data breach vary 
from universities to financial institutions.  From January 2005 through 
September 2008, no fewer than 200 American universities, representing 
every region of the country, experienced a data breach.64  Financial 
institutions have also been a common target.  Financial giants, including 
CitiFinancial, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and Wachovia, have all 
experienced a substantial data breach.65  Other recognizable companies 
representing an array of industries that have experienced a data breach 
include Boeing, MCI, Kaiser Permanente, Kraft Foods, MTV Networks, 
Advance Auto Parts, Harley Davidson, Inc., AT&T, and Lloyds of 
London, just to name a few.66  Additionally, government entities on the 
                                                 
59 Thomas Claburn, The Cost of Data Loss Rises, INFORMATIONWEEK, Nov. 28, 2007, 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/internet/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=204204152 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2009) [hereinafter Claburn, The Cost of Data Loss Rises]. 
60 Reportable and Multiple Privacy Breaches Rising at Alarming Rate, According to 
Deloitte, Ponemon Institute Survey, PRNEWSWIRE, Dec. 11, 2007, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS233283+11-Dec-2007+PRN20071211 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2009). 
61 Id. 
62 Erin Fonté, Who Should Pay the Price for Identity Theft?, 54 FED. LAW. 24, 25 (2007). 
63 Id. 
64 The universities targeted represent every geographic region; from the University of 
Florida to the University of Alaska; from the University of San Diego to Harvard 
University; and all points in between.  Privacy Rights Clearinghouse: A Chronology of 
Data Breaches, http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm#CP (last visited 
Mar. 30, 2009). 
65 Id.; see Kathryn E. Picanso, Protecting Information Security Under a Uniform Data 
Breach Notification Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 356 (2006). 
66 Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, supra note 64. 
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federal,67 state,68 and local69 levels have experienced a data breach.  These 
incidents indicate that data breach can occur in any size company, in any 
region, and in any industry.  Failing to protect PII, therefore, is not far 
removed from financial Russian roulette. 
 
B.  SOURCES AND SCOPE OF DATA BREACH 
 
[18]  Data breach results from a plethora of sources.70  The loss of laptops 
and similar devices is the most common source of data breach, accounting 
for forty-nine percent of data breaches.71  Each laptop lost accounts for an 
extraordinarily large number of compromised files.72  Between 2005 and 
2006, thirty-two million compromised files were attributable to 
approximately seventy stolen laptops.73  In May 2006, the theft of a laptop 
and a computer storage device compromised data on 28.6 million 
veterans.74  This trend continued through 2007 and 2008.  In September 
2007, the loss of a laptop at Gap, Inc. compromised the personal 
information of 800,000 job applicants.75  Some months later, in March 
2008, the loss of a box of computer tapes at Bank of New York Mellon 
compromised the personal information of approximately 12.5 million 
customers.76  As with data breach in general, breach due to loss of laptops 
and other equipment is not specific to any particular industry.77  Incidents 
                                                 
67 The Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Defense, the Department of 
Transportation, and the Department of Veterans Affairs suffered breaches.  Id. 
68 Georgia, Massachusetts, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Rhode Island all experienced 
a breach at some level.  Id. 
69 School Districts in Beaverton, Oregon and San Diego, California, and the Detroit 
Water and Sewage Department were also breached.  Id.   
70 Liisa M. Thomas, The Emerging Law of Data Security: From Corporate Obligations to 
Provide Security to Breach Notification Requirements, 934 PLI/PAT. 357, 368 (2008). 
71 PONEMON INSTITUTE, LLC, 2007 ANNUAL STUDY: U.S. COST OF A DATA BREACH 11 
fig.3 (2007) [hereinafter PONEMON INSTITUTE, LLC, 2007 ANNUAL STUDY]. 
72 Chad Pinson, New Legal Frontier: Mass Information Loss and Security Breach, 11 
SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 27, 28 (2007). 
73 Id. 
74 Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, supra note 64. 
75 Id. 
76 This estimate was reached in August 2008, a significant increase from the original 
estimate of 4.5 million.  Id. 
77 Id.  
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have occurred in the financial78 and healthcare sectors,79 at universities,80 
and at various levels of government.81 
 
[19]  Third parties or outsourcers, malicious insiders, hacked systems, and 
malicious codes also create a large number of data breaches.82  While 
these incidents are less common than breach due to lost laptops, the 
aggregate number of records compromised is extremely high.83  Hackers 
are particularly troublesome because they can compromise information 
without detection84 and are extremely difficult to catch.85  The scope of 
data loss that results when a system is breached can be astronomical.  To 
date, the most infamous data breach occurred at TJX Companies, Inc., 
where hackers compromised ninety-four million credit card and debit card 
accounts.86  Other major data breaches caused by hackers have occurred at 
CardSystems Solutions, Inc. (forty million credit card records were 
compromised),87 Monster.com (1.6 million resumes were compromised),88 
                                                 
78 Incidents have occurred at CitiFinancial, J.P. Morgan Chase, and Bank of America, just 
to name a few of the larger players.  Id.   
79 Incidents have occurred at Aetna and Kaiser Permanente.  Id. 
80 Among others, incidents have occurred at George Mason University, Montclair State 
University, and Cornell University.  Id. 
81 Id., supra notes 67-69. 
82 See PONEMON INSTITUTE, LLP, 2007 ANNUAL STUDY, supra note 71, at 11 fig.3.  
(illustrating the allocation of the causes of data breach: laptops lost or stolen (49%); third 
party or outsourcers (16%); malicious insiders (9%); paper records (9%); electronic 
backup (7%); hacked systems (5%); malicious codes, like malware and spyware (4%); 
and other (2%)).   
83 Id. 
84 See G. Martin Bingisser, Data Privacy and Breach Reporting: Compliance with 
Various State Laws, 4 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 9, ¶ 24 (2008). 
85 Hoofnagle, supra note 33, at 107-08. 
86 Martin H. Bosworth, TJX To Pay Mastercard $24 Million for Data Breach, 
CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, Apr. 6, 2008, 
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2008/04/tjx_mc.html (last visited Mar. 31, 
2009); Jon Swartz, TJX Data Breach May Involve 94 Million Credit Cards, USA 
TODAY.COM, Oct. 24, 2007, 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/computersecurity/infotheft/2007-10-24-tjx-security-
breach_N.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2009).  See generally Richard A. Epstein & Thomas 
P. Brown, Cybersecurity in the Payment Card Industry, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 203 (2008) 
(providing an expansive analysis of the TJX debacle). 
87 Jonathan Krim & Michael Barbaro, 40 Million Credit Card Numbers Hacked, WASH. 
POST, June 18, 2005, at A1. 
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and TD Ameritrade Holding Corp (contact information for 6.3 million 
individuals was compromised).89 
 
[20]  Similarly, malicious insiders can account for massive amounts of 
compromised data.  In 2007, a malicious insider at Fidelity National 
Information Systems stole 8.5 million customer records.90  In 2008, a 
similar event at Countrywide Financial Corp. resulted in two million 
compromised files.91 
 
C.  ASSESSING THE PROBLEM 
 
[21]  Data breach clearly presents a growing threat for U.S. companies, 
both in incidence and scope.  Perhaps fortunately, however, many of the 
threats to data security are organic and may be curtailed through strict 
enforcement of internal data protection policies.92  In addition, solutions 
including encryption, spyware and virus detection, and access protocols 
leverage technology to prevent breach.93  As corporate America becomes 
more dependent upon the electronic use of PII, and as the liability costs of 
failing to protect that information rise, the internal decision makers must 
accept the reality that PII management and protection demands a greater 
allocation of company resources. 
                                                                                                                         
88 Job Seekers Compromised by Monster.com Hack, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, Aug. 22, 
2007, http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2007/08/monster_hack.html (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2009). 
89 Martin H. Bosworth, Hackers Steal Information on 6.3 Million Ameritrade Customers, 
CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, Sept. 15, 2007, 
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2007/09/ameritrade_hack.html, (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2009). 
90 Jaikumar Vijayan, Fidelity National Data Theft Affects 8.5 Million Customers, 
PCWORLD, July 27, 2007, 
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/135117/fidelity_national_data_theft_ 
ffects_85_million_ customers.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2009). 
91 Renae Merle, Countrywide Says Consumer Data Were Sold, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 
2008, at F5. 
92 See PONEMON INSTITUTE, LLP, 2007 ANNUAL STUDY, supra note 71, at 11. 
93 See Thomas M. Laudise, Ten Practical Things To Know About “Sensitive” Data 
Collection and Protection, 929 PLI/PAT. 389, 405 (2008). 
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V.  PRIVACY LEGISLATION: THE PUZZLE OF FEDERAL AND STATE SPHERES 
OF COVERAGE 
 
[22]  Currently, privacy regulation in the United States is best described as 
a haphazard set of industry specific regulations, at both the federal and 
state level, which frequently overlap and are often contradictory.94  
Congress has approached privacy regulation with sectoral legislation95 
introducing “specific remedies to specific problems.”96  Where gaps exist 
in this sectoral approach, Congress has delegated authority to the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) “to enforce privacy policy promises under its 
general unfair and deceptive practice powers.”97  In contrast, state 
legislation offers a broad approach to PII regulation, the most significant 
of which are data breach notification laws.98  Despite the patchwork nature 
of current privacy legislation, it is clear that “[t]he trend in the law is 
toward imposition of more stringent and more detailed baseline 
requirements for achieving and demonstrating adequate information 
security for protected information.”99  This trend will translate into 
potentially debilitating costs for companies that fail to keep up with the 
required level of information security. 
                                                 
94 Walker, supra note 7, ¶ 118. 
95 Corey A. Ciocchetti, E-Commerce and Information Privacy: Privacy Policies as 
Personal Information Protectors, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 55, 73 (2007) [hereinafter Ciocchetti, 
E-Commerce and Information Privacy] 
96 Id.  The U.S. approach contrasts sharply with the approach taken by some of our 
closest trade partners.  For example, the European Union’s regulatory approach provides 
broad statements of privacy “principles to which society must adhere.”  Id.  Additionally, 
U.S. federal and state “statutes have generally been narrow in scope compared to the 
more ‘horizontal’ privacy legislation enacted in Canada.”  Mark S. Hayes, The Impact of 
Privacy on Intellectual Property in Canada, 20 Intell. Prop. J. 67, 69 n.3 (2006). 
97 Ciocchetti, E-Commerce and Information Privacy, supra note 95, at 73. 
98 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-65 (2008). 
99 John B. Kennedy, A Primer on Key Information Security Laws in the United States, 
934 PLI/PAT. 117, 126 (2008). 
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A.  FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SECTORAL APPROACH 
 
[23]  Congress’ sectoral approach100 generally targets four key areas.101  
Three of these areas, concern regulation of private entities, while the 
fourth concerns regulation of governmental entities.102  First, the 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (“COPPA”) covers 
children under the age of thirteen.103  Second, the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) applies to health 
care institutions and providers.104  Third, the Financial Services 
Moderation Act, known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 
(“GLBA”) regulates financial institutions.105 
 
1.  COPPA 
 
[24]  COPPA is an expansive piece of legislation.  The purpose of COPPA 
is to prevent unfair and deceptive practices concerning children’s PII by 
prohibiting the unauthorized collection of PII from children under the age 
of thirteen.106  Congress enacted COPPA: 
 
(1) to enhance parental involvement in a child’s online 
activities in order to protect the privacy of children in the 
                                                 
100 Commentators note that “U.S. privacy laws to date exist in targeted industries, such as 
the financial and medical and health industries.”  Taft, supra note 13, at 492. 
101 Ciocchetti, E-Commerce and Information Privacy, supra note 95, at 73-74. 
102 The focus here is on the federal statutory approach to privacy protection as it relates to 
non-governmental entities.  There are other statutory mechanisms enacted for the purpose 
of protecting privacy that are applicable to governmental entities.  See, e.g., Privacy Act 
of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000) (protecting federal records that contain PII and creating 
restrictions and requirements for federal agencies with regard to information disclosure); 
see also Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2000) (prohibiting the 
disclosure and use of State motor vehicle records); Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.); E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
347, 116 Stat. 2899 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 10, 13, 15, 18, 28, 31, 
40, 41, and 44 U.S.C.) (requiring government agencies to publish Privacy Impact 
Assessments). 
103 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2006). 
104 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).   
105 Financial Modernization Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2006). 
106 Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998); see also 144 Cong. Rec. S12741-04 
(1998). 
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online environment; (2) to enhance parental involvement to 
help protect the safety of children in online fora such as 
chatrooms, home pages, and pen-pal services in which 
children may make public postings of identifying 
information; (3) to maintain the security of personally 
identifiable information of children collected online; and 
(4) to protect children’s privacy by limiting the collection 
of personal information from children without parental 
consent.107 
 
2.  HIPAA 
 
[25]  In 1996, Congress attempted to standardize privacy concerning 
health care information with HIPAA.108  To foster efficiency, HIPAA 
requires the standardization of electronic data interchange in healthcare 
delivery.109  HIPPA also addresses the confidentiality and security of 
health data by setting standards and the means of enforcing those 
standards.110  The legislation requires the Department of Health and 
Human Services to publish new rules that will ensure “[s]tandardization of 
electronic patient health, administrative and financial data,” “[u]nique 
health identifiers for individuals, employers, health plans and health care 
providers,” and “[s]ecurity standards protecting the confidentiality and 
integrity of ‘individually identifiable health information,’ past, present and 
future.”111 
 
3.  GLBA 
 
[26]  As HIPAA protects health information, GLBA protects financial 
information.112  GLBA imposes new requirements and rules on financial 
                                                 
107 Janine Hiller et al., Pocket Protection, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 417, 428 (2008) (citing 144 
Cong. Rec. S12741-04 (1998) (remarks of Sen. Bryan)). 
108 HIPAA, Whatis.com, http://searchcio.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid19_ 
gci862786,00.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2009). 
109 Vox2Data: Electronic Health Record and Voice Activated Transcription Software for 
Physicians, http://www.vox2data.com/faqs.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2009). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 See Anthony Rollo, The New New Litigation Thing: Consumer Privacy, 1301 
PLI/CORP. 9, 27 (2002). 
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institutions, including: requirements to protect personal financial 
information of customers, restrictions on disclosure to non-affiliate third 
parties, requirements to disclose security and privacy policies to 
consumers, and prohibitions of the use of fraudulent means to obtain 
financial information.113  Importantly, GLBA contained new privacy 
regulations to protect financial “nonpublic personal information.”114 
 
B.  DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS 
 
[27]  Following a general trend of information disclosure,115 commentators 
and legislatures turned their attention to laws requiring companies to 
disclose data security breaches shortly after the turn of the millennium.  
The approach of data breach notification laws differs from the sectoral 
approach in two principal respects.  First, where the sectoral approach 
provides comprehensive regulation, including preventative requirements, 
data breach notification regulation concerns post-breach requirements.116  
Second, data breach notification laws generally transcend the limited 
approach of addressing individual sectors by focusing broadly on all 
entities that store or maintain PII.117 
 
                                                 
113 GLBA extends beyond what would traditionally be considered a financial institution.  
“Among the institutions that fall under FTC jurisdiction for purposes of the GLB Act are 
non-bank mortgage lenders, loan brokers, some financial or investment advisers, tax 
preparers, providers of real estate settlement services, and debt collectors.”  Federal 
Trade Commission, In Brief: The Financial Privacy Requirements of the Graham-Leach-
Bliley Act, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/idtheft/bus53.pdf. 
114 DeVries, supra note 1, at 299 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) (2006)). 
115 See Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 
105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 916 (2007).  Professors Schwartz and Janger provide the 
following examples of other information disclosure requirements: mandates that hospitals 
“publicize performance results for certain medical procedures,” mandates that 
manufacturers affix energy efficiency labels to products, and mandates that companies 
report workplace injuries.  Id. at 915.  Cass Sunstein coined the term “regulation through 
disclosure” to describe this trend.  Id. (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Information Regulation 
and Information Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 613 (1999)).  
116 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) (2006) (regulating financial institutions) with N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 75-65 (2008) (affecting any business that “owns or licenses personal 
information”). 
117 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-65 (2008). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology  Volume XV, Issue 4 
 
19 
[28]  While numerous data breach notification bills have been 
introduced,118 there is currently no broad-based federal data breach 
notification legislation.119  Further, it is questionable if the bills now 
before Congress will become law.120  As consumers become more 
conscious of the precarious state of their privacy interests in their PII, and 
companies become overwhelmed by the difficulties of complying with 
numerous state laws, it is reasonable to assume that Congress will enact 
federal legislation to bring consistency to the area of data breach 
notification law.   
 
[29]  While a federal law is lacking, forty-four states, as well as the 
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, have enacted data breach 
notification legislation.121  State data breach notification laws generally 
require companies to inform customers when a data breach affecting 
consumer information occurs.122  In most states, any entity that owns, 
licenses, or maintains PII belonging to a citizen of that state falls under the 
                                                 
118 Brandon Faulkner, Note, Hacking into Data Breach Notification Laws, 59 FLA. L. 
REV. 1097, 1114, 1114 nn.115 & 117 (2007) (citing numerous bills introduced during the 
109th and 110th Congresses); see also Senate Vote on Data Brokers Likely This Week, 
CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, Sept. 25, 2006, 
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2005/senate_data_privacy.html (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2009). 
119 Kristan T. Cheng, Identity Theft and the Case for a National Credit Report Freeze 
Law, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 239, 269-70 (2008); see James T. Graves, Note, 
Minnesota’s PCI Law: A Small Step on the Path to a Statutory Duty of Data Security Due 
Care, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1115, 1120 (2008).  One commentator has opined that 
the lack of a federal law reflects “growing concerns that most of the bills would take a 
step backward from existing state laws.”  Vinita Bali, Data Privacy, Data Piracy: Can 
India Provide Adequate Protection for Electronically Transferred Data?, 21 TEMP. INT’L 
& COMP. L.J. 103, 115 (2007). 
120 Kennedy, supra note 99, at 209. 
121 See National Conference of State Legislatures, State Security Breach Notification 
Laws, http://www.ncsl.org/ programs/lis/cip/priv/breachlaws.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 
2009).  Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, 
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have data breach notification laws.  Id. 
122 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7501 (2009); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
445.72 (2007). 
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statutory purview.123  State laws differ, to a degree, on the types of actions 
triggering the duty to disclose.  Some states require disclosure upon 
breach, while other states require disclosure when, after internal 
investigation, PII is believed to have been compromised.124  In addition, 
most state laws do not require disclosure if it was encrypted data that was 
lost.125 
 
C.  THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE AMERICA 
 
[30]  The cost of failing to comply with federal privacy regulation 
warrants the attention of corporate America.126  HIPAA, for example, 
provides for civil and criminal penalties.127  Failure to comply with 
HIPAA’s requirements creates civil “penalties of $100 per violation, up to 
$25,000 per year.”128  Criminal sanctions, however, are much more severe, 
reaching up to $250,000 in fines and ten years in prison.129  While COPPA 
does not carry criminal penalties,130 the FTC sent companies a clear 
message that violations of COPPA will receive severe treatment.131  In 
2006, the FTC pursued Xanga.com for COPPA violations; the controversy 
ended in a settlement agreement that required Xanga.com to “pay a $1 
million fine, implement policies compliant with COPPA, file additional 
                                                 
123 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-716(2)(a)-(b) (2009); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
75-65 (2008). 
124 Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7501 (2009) (requiring notification after a 
breach), with CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-701b (2009) (not requiring notification after a 
breach if a reasonable determination is made “that the breach will not likely result in 
harm to the individuals whose personal information has been acquired and accessed”). 
125 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. §24-4.9-3-3 (2008). 
126 Foley, supra note 12, at 18 (“Noncompliance with regulatory schemes may result in 
orders prohibiting data use or other practices, civil or criminal fines, imprisonment for 
managers and directors, or decades-long oversight by regulatory agencies.”). 
127 American Medical Association, HIPAA Violations and Enforcement, 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/11805.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2009) 
(discussing HIPAA violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2006)). 
128 Id.; see Lewis, supra note 3, at 141-42. 
129 American Medical Association, supra note 119. 
130 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2006). 
131 See Hiller et al., supra note 107, at 418 (“The FTC fine against Xanga was the largest 
ever imposed under COPPA.”) 
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status reports, and submit to monitoring by the FTC.”132  These examples 
are just the beginning.  As the threat to PII grows, so will the breadth of 
statutory coverage and consequences of failing to adhere to federal 
mandates. 
 
[31]  The costs associated with state regulation may be even more 
substantial.133  Depending upon the amount of information compromised, 
the process of data breach notification can create substantial costs.134  A 
2007 study estimates that notification of data breach costs $15 per 
record.135  Providing notification for breaches similar in scale to those 
sustained by TJX136 or CardSystems137 could result in costs that would 
prove debilitating to many U.S. companies.  The challenge of adhering to 
the different notification requirements of different state statutes adds 
significant strategic obstacles, and failure to provide adequate notification 
can create additional costs.  For example, under Florida’s data breach 
notification statute, a company may be liable “[i]n the amount of $1,000 
for each day the breach goes undisclosed for up to 30 days and, thereafter, 
$50,000 for each 30-day period or portion thereof for up to 180 days.”138  
Furthermore, companies that do not disclose within 180 days may be 
                                                 
132 Id. (citing Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Xanga.com To Pay $1 Million to 
Violating Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule (Sept. 7, 2006) available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/09/xanga.shtm). 
133 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 99, at 185 (noting that “[i]n addition to state Attorney 
Generals, other state agencies have sometimes been involved in the enforcement of their 
state’s breach notification laws.”). 
134 See Ellen Messmer, TJX Lists Mounting Costs of Data-Breach Debacle, NETWORK 
WORLD, June 8, 2007, http://www.networkworld.com/news/2007/060807-tjx.html (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2009) (“In its quarterly filing with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, TJX acknowledged that the computer intrusion . . . cost it $20 million 
during the first quarter alone, and that costs were expected to continue to mount in future 
quarters.”). 
135 PONEMON INSTITUTE, LLC, 2007 ANNUAL STUDY, supra note 71, at 9. 
136 See Bosworth, TJX To Pay Mastercard $24 Million for Data Breach, supra note 86; 
Swartz, supra note 86. 
137 See Krim & Barbaro, supra note 87. 
138 FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(b)(1) (2008). 
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subject to “an administrative fine of up to $500,000”139 and the cost of 
failing to notify increases with each state statute that is implicated.140 
 
[32]  While the fines resulting from noncompliance with privacy 
legislation, and the cost associated with providing data breach notification 
are substantial, the prospect of tighter, more comprehensive regulation 
may be even more daunting.  Companies obviously have a significant 
interest in crafting their own data protection protocols.141  But if the high 
incidence of data breach continues, governmental bodies may find it 
necessary to enact legislation that will impose broader and more 
burdensome requirements for data protection.  More concerning is the fact 
that legislatures may create laws restricting the ability of companies to 
access, store, use, and transfer electronic data.142  To prevent the 
enactment of legislative measures of this type, companies must take it 
upon themselves to reduce the incidence of data breach by proactively 
creating internal measures that effectively provide for the protection of 
PII. 
 
VI.  PRIVACY LAWSUITS 
 
A.  PRIVATE SUITS 
 
[33]  Some commentators argue that traditional tort doctrines adequately 
protect against harms caused by loss or misuse of personal information.143  
                                                 
139 FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(b)(2) (2008). 
140 See Kirk J. Nahra, New State Information-Security Requirements Challenge Business, 
PRIVACY IN FOCUS, Nov. 2008, at 1, 
http://www.wileyrein.com/docs/newsletter_issues/622.pdf. 
141 See id., at 2, 4, 5. 
142 See Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, Recent State Data Privacy Laws and Court 
Decisions Impose Extensive Obligations on Companies that Collect and Process 
Personal Information, Oct. 10, 2008, 
http://www.willkie.com/files/tbl_s29Publications%5CFileUpload5686%5C2732%5CRec
ent_State_Data_Privacy_Laws.pdf (“Companies doing business in [] states must 
carefully review these new requirements and develop and implement compliance 
procedures to protect adequately the nonpublic personal information they collect, store, 
and distribute.”). 
143 See Walker, supra note 7, ¶ 171 (noting that “[c]onsumers can already sue a company 
whose system was hacked” and that “private sector enforcement . . . is the real 
enforcement mechanism for meaningful security”). 
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Currently, however, the bridge between traditional tort and privacy law is 
incomplete.144  Many potential lawsuits are never filed because the market 
or judicial valuation of an individual’s PII is not sufficiently high to offset 
the cost of litigation.145  Further, as damages are usually difficult to prove, 
even a verdict for the plaintiff does not guarantee an award of damages.146 
 
[34]  But, certain political and legislative developments indicate that the 
climate could soon change.147  Proposed theories for extending liability for 
data breach to companies holding PII already exist in academic 
literature.148  It is likely only a matter of time before courts begin to adopt 
similar theories of liability and common law standards emerge.149  
Companies will have to defend against lawsuits brought by individuals 
harmed by data breach and financial institutions that incur costs due to 
data breach.150  Minnesota has already enacted a statute that allows 
financial institutions to pursue retailers and merchants for costs incurred 
due to data breach,151 and similar legislation is pending in other states.152  
                                                 
144 See Paul M. Schwartz, Spyware: The Latest Cyber-Regulatory Challenge: Privacy and 
Inalienability and the Regulation of Spyware, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1269, 1275 
(2005) 
145 See Walker, supra note 7, ¶¶ 168, 178; Schwartz, supra note 144, at 1275. 
146 Schwartz, supra note 144, at 1275; Levenson, supra note 32, at 102. 
147 See Parks & Adams, supra note 50 (“Congress and state legislatures have begun 
considering new laws relating to data privacy and security.”). 
148 See Jennifer A. Chandler, Negligence Liability for Breaches of Data Security, 23 
BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 223, 225 (2008) (addressing “the possibility of using liability in 
negligence as a means to deter unreasonably careless data security practices as well as to 
offer compensation to those harmed by data security breaches.”); Meiring de Villiers, 
Reasonable Foreseeability in Information Security Law: A Forensic Analysis, 30 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 419, 420 (2008) (presenting “an analysis of civil liability 
for failure to safeguard confidential information.”); Levenson, supra note 32, at 97 
(finding “a legal cause of action for a breach of contract against a corporation that 
aggregates personally identifiable information”); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 10, at 237 
(arguing “that Learned Hand’s famous risk/utility test should be extended to create a duty 
to secure computer systems applicable against companies that hold sensitive personal 
information”). 
149 See, e.g., Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Lockyer, 541 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that California’s Financial Information Privacy Act was not preempted by the 
Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act). 
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Swartz, supra note 86. 
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Once this occurs, the extension of liability will develop rapidly from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
 
[35]  As noted above, state laws that create a right of action for financial 
institutions are emerging.153  The settlements between TJX and financial 
institutions that incurred losses due to the TJX breach illustrate the 
magnitude of the costs companies may incur by failing to protect PII.154  
By mid-2008, TJX had spent tens of millions of dollars settling with 
financial institutions, including a $24 million settlement with MasterCard 
and its issuing lenders,155 and a larger $40.9 million settlement with 
Visa.156  These settlements are likely to embolden financial institutions in 
the future to take PII security seriously, thereby increasing the liability of 
companies that fail to follow suit. 
 
B.  GOVERNMENT LAWSUITS 
 
1.  FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT 
 
[36]  The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has the authority to fill in 
the gaps left by Congress’s sectoral approach.157  Initially, the FTC 
suggested that industry self-regulation offered the best defense of online 
                                                                                                                         
152 Id. at 186-87 (noting that similar legislation to Minnesota’s statute is also pending in 
Texas, Illinois, Michigan, Washington, and Massachusetts). 
153 See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.  As Attorney John Kennedy of Dewey 
& LeBoeuf notes, “[t]hese statutes reverse court decisions that came in the wake of the 
breach at BJ's Warehouse in which courts dismissed all claims against BJ's by banks that 
had to replace payment cards following the theft of customer card data from BJ's.”  
Kennedy, supra note 99, at 187. 
154 See Bosworth, TJX To Pay Mastercard $24 Million for Data Breach, supra note 86; 
Swartz, supra note 86. 
155 Linda McGlasson, TJX, MasterCard Agree on $24 Million Settlement: Institutions 
Have 90 Days to Approve Deal in Data Breach Case, BANK INFO SECURITY, Apr. 4, 
2008, http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/articles. php?art_id=811 (last visited Mar. 31, 
2009); Bosworth, TJX To Pay Mastercard $24 Million for Data Breach, supra note 86. 
156 Mark Jewell, TJX, Visa Reach $40.9M Settlement for Data Breach, USA TODAY, 
Nov. 30, 2007, http:// www.usatoday.com/money/industries/retail/2007-11-30-tjx-visa-
breach-settlement_N.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2009); see Mark Huffman, TJX Settles 
Visa Suit Over Data Breach, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, Nov. 30, 2007, http://www. 
consumeraffairs.com/news04/2007/11/tjx_visa.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2009). 
157 See Ciocchetti, E-Commerce and Information Privacy, supra note 95, at 73. 
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privacy.158  Not long after taking this position, however, the FTC 
performed an about-face, recognizing that industry self-regulation had 
fallen short of its goals.159  After reevaluating the necessity of its 
involvement, the FTC asserted itself as a major player in the pursuit of 
privacy violations. 
 
[37]  In 2000, the FTC trained its sights on the ad-serving company, 
DoubleClick.160  Privacy alarms sounded when DoubleClick announced its 
intention to acquire Abacus Corp., a business that used traditional direct 
marketing and had a massive database of consumer PII.161  The pairing of 
these two companies could have led to very extensive and detailed profiles 
of Internet users.162  The FTC initiated its investigation based on a 
complaint that DoubleClick had engaged in unfair and deceptive trade 
practices by tracking online activities of Internet users and combining that 
data with detailed PII contained in a separate national marketing 
database.163  DoubleClick placed “cookies” in banner advertisements on 
WebPages.164  Clicking on these banner ads would redirect the Internet 
browser to a DoubleClick server.165  This permitted DoubleClick to create 
                                                 
158 See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, SELF-REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE 6 (1999), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/07/privacy99.pdf.  
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IN ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE, at ii-iii (2000), available at 
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160 See Linda A. Goldstein, Consumer Privacy Online: Recent Trends and Updates, 748 
PLI/PAT. 1145, 1161 (2003); Ira S. Rubinstein et al., Data Mining and Internet Profiling: 
Emerging Regulatory and Technological Approaches, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 261, 271 
(2008). 
161 Rubinstein et al., supra note 160, at 271; Seth Richard Lesser, Privacy Law in the 
Internet Era: New Developments and Directions, 701 PLI/PAT. 115, 123 (2002). 
162  See Frederic Debusseré, The EU E-Privacy Directive: A Monstrous Attempt to Starve 
the Cookie Monster?, 13 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 70, 71 (2005). 
163 See Lesser, supra note 161, at 121-22. 
164 Ciocchetti, The Privacy Matrix, supra note 2, at 257, 257 n.32 (citing Marshall Brain, 
How Internet Cookies Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM, 
http://www.howstuffworks.com/cookie.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2009)). 
165 Lesser, supra note 161, at 121-22; see Ken Dreifach, Data Privacy, Web Security, and 
Attorney General and FTC Enforcement, 902 PLI/PAT. 207, 224 (2007). 
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profiles about users and their Internet surfing habits.166  Concern over the 
possibility of privacy intrusion led to multiple state and federal lawsuits.167 
 
[38]  In the end, the court consolidated these suits, and DoubleClick 
settled.168  The terms of the settlement required DoubleClick to: (1) create 
an easy to read privacy policy, which outlines the company’s use of 
cookies and pixel tags, and explains its online advertising service; (2) 
launch 300 million banner advertisements on sites across the internet that 
explain how consumers can protect their privacy, opt out of having a 
DoubleClick advertisement server cookie placed on their computers, and 
how cookies are used and data is collected; (3) purge user information that 
the company collected on consumers on a regular basis; (4) hire an 
accounting firm to audit its compliance with the terms; and (5) pay $1.8 
million in attorneys’ fees.169 
 
[39]  The FTC obtained another large privacy-related settlement from the 
data broker ChoicePoint.170  ChoicePoint compiled and sold PII.171  In 
2005, the company announced that it sold information to people who 
turned out to be identity thieves.172  The FTC charged ChoicePoint with 
violating the “Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by furnishing consumer 
reports – credit histories – to subscribers who did not have a permissible 
purpose to obtain them, and by failing to maintain reasonable procedures 
to verify both [subscriber] identities and how [the subscriber’s] intended to 
use the information.”173  The FTC reached a settlement with ChoicePoint, 
                                                 
166 Lesser, supra note 161, at 122; see Ian Rambarran & Robert Hunt, Are Browse-Wrap 
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2002, 
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requiring the company to pay $5 million to reimburse consumers for 
expenses due to identity theft.174  ChoicePoint also agreed to pay $10 
million in civil penalties175 and implement new procedures to ensure that 
consumer reports are provided to only “legitimate businesses for lawful 
purposes, to establish and maintain a comprehensive information security 
program, and to obtain audits by an independent third party security 
professional every other year until 2026.”176  Not only must the company 
pay for an independent third party review, but if the review is not up to 
FTC standards, the FTC could potentially reopen the settlement until 
2026. 
 
2.  STATE ENFORCEMENT 
 
[40]  In addition to the FTC, state attorney generals can bring significant 
privacy lawsuits against companies.177  In Hatch v. U.S. Bank, N.A.,178 
U.S. Bank sold customer information, including checking account and 
credit card numbers, account activity information, marital status, gender, 
social security numbers, bankruptcy scores, and other information, to 
telemarketing firms for more than $4 million.179  Minnesota’s attorney 
general filed suit against U.S. Bank for consumer fraud, false advertising, 
deceptive trade practices, and state common law privacy problems in 
connection with sales of bank customer’s private information.180  The 
bank quickly settled, agreeing to: inform customers of its privacy policy 
and provide customers the ability to opt out of sharing information with 
affiliated organizations, make refunds to customers who purchased 
services and were not happy, and pay a substantial settlement.181  
Ultimately, the settlement amount reached $4 million dollars.182 
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[41]  In New York, attorney general Eliot Spitzer sued Chase Manhattan 
Bank (“Chase”) for sharing its cardholders’ personal information with 
third party marketers without first disclosing this sharing to its 
customers.183  The state reached a settlement with the bank that provided 
significant privacy protection for New York customers, exceeding the 
protections provided by the GLBA.184  Chase altered privacy policies by 
ceasing to share PII with unaffiliated third parties, and only shared names, 
addresses, and phone numbers with affiliates.185  Customers could also opt 
out of any information sharing.186  In addition to agreeing to refrain from 
sharing consumer’s personal financial information, Chase paid attorneys 
fees in the amount of $101,500 to the attorney general.187 
 
VII.  THE CONSUMER EFFECT 
 
[42]  As discussed above, state legislatures are increasing their regulatory 
roles in protecting PII, and Congress is likely to follow.  The FTC and 
state attorney generals are similarly increasing their presence and 
consumers are exerting a corresponding pressure that companies are 
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beginning to feel.188  As the public becomes more conscious of the 
precarious state of consumer privacy interest in their PII, consumer 
pressure on businesses will increase proportionately.  Soon, businesses 
may face the choice of either proactively protecting their consumer’s PII 
or losing their customer base. 
 
A.  THE IMPETUS FOR CONSUMER ACTION 
 
[43]  In 2005, approximately twelve percent of nine thousand consumers 
surveyed had received notification regarding a breach of their PII.189  Of 
these breaches, eighty-six percent involved the loss or theft of consumer 
information, while the remaining fourteen percent involved employee, 
student, medical, and taxpayer data.190 
 
[44]  In 2006, the cost of fraud was an estimated at $55.7 billion.191  
Victims of privacy breach and identify theft “estimate[d] the total value of 
all charges on fraudulent accounts in their name” at $87,303 on average.192  
Individual consumer estimates ranged from $50 to $500,000 per act, and 
the average estimate loss to business creditors due to fraud have increased 
seventy-eight percent since 2004.193  Furthermore, resolution of privacy 
breaches takes the consumer significant time and funding.  While it is 
estimated that the consumer spends ninety-seven hours to repair the 
damage when an existing account has been used to affect fraud, if a new 
account has been created in the victim’s name, resolution of the breach 
skyrockets to 231 hours.194  In 2006, the average consumer’s out-of-pocket 
costs to resolve breaches for existing or new accounts averaged $1,884 
and $1,342 respectively.195  Not surprisingly, “theft or loss of personal and 
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financial information is the No. 1 concern of consumers worldwide (64 
percent).”196 
 
B.  THE COST OF LOST CONSUMER CONFIDENCE 
 
[45]  Loss of customer information can have detrimental effects on 
businesses, and a reduction in consumer confidence may translate to a 
reduction in future revenue.197  Repeated instances of personal information 
security breaches will likely have a negative impact on a corporation’s 
customer base.198  Specifically, in response to receiving two or more 
notifications of a privacy breach, most customers would take their 
business elsewhere.199  Further, breaches diminish the potential for 
bringing in new customers.200  Given the astonishingly high rate of 
security lapses, it is clear that the impact on corporate goodwill and brand 
image is a “strategic risk that requires the attention of senior 
management.”201 
 
[46]  A recent study suggests that loss of goodwill results in quantifiable 
financial harm.202  The Ponemon Institute suggests privacy breaches 
“translate[] to lost business opportunity.” 203  Lost opportunity is measured 
through “customer churn and acquisition costs,” which have risen “from 
$98 per record in 2006 to $128 in 2007 – a [thirty percent] increase.”204  
The impact of this upward trend cannot be overemphasized.  As consumer 
awareness increases, the rate of consumer turnover will likely follow. 
 
                                                 
196 Press Release, Visa Inc., Technology, Cross-Industry Collaboration Key to Enhancing 
Data Security (Jan. 25, 2006), available at 
http://www.corporate.visa.com/md/nr/press280.jsp. 
197 PONEMON INSTITUTE, LLC, 2006 ANNUAL STUDY: COST OF A DATA BREACH 5 (2006) 
[hereinafter PONEMON INSTITUTE, LLC, 2006 ANNUAL STUDY]. 
198 The Ponemon Institute identifies this as customer churning: “[t]he estimated number 
of customers that will most likely terminate their relationship as a result of the breach 
incident.”  PONEMON INSTITUTE, LLC, 2007 ANNUAL STUDY, supra note 71, at 7. 
199 Jennifer McAdams, After the Data Breach: Navigating State Disclosure Laws, 
COMPUTERWORLD, Oct. 29, 2007. 
200 PONEMON INSTITUTE, LLC, 2007 ANNUAL STUDY, supra note 71, at 7. 
201 PRNEWSWIRE, supra note 60. 
202 Claburn, The Costs of Data Loss Rises, supra note 59. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology  Volume XV, Issue 4 
 
31 
[47]  In addition to loss of goodwill are the costs associated with 
“reputation management and customer support costs including information 
hotlines and credit monitoring subscription for victims.”205  Victims of 
privacy theft suffer adverse effects on insurance and credit rates, difficulty 
in obtaining credit, as well as struggles in seeking employment.206  
Clearly, if the consumer is bearing the burden of a company’s 
malfeasance, it is unlikely that they will remain a loyal customer.  The 
adverse effects of customer turnover can cause unforeseeable and lasting 
reductions in revenue.207 
 
VIII.  THE WRITING ON THE WALL 
 
[48]  As the preceding demonstrates, the responsible use of PII translates 
into substantial operational benefits and profit potential, while the failure 
to maintain and use PII properly creates enormous liabilities.  PII directly 
affects a company’s bottom line—whether it does so positively or 
negatively is largely the result of the manner in which the company 
approaches PII security.  It is clear, therefore, that the leaders of corporate 
America must acknowledge the real value of PII by proactively protecting 
against the threats posed to PII and respecting an individual’s privacy 
interest in such information.208 
 
[49]  The exact manner in which individual companies approach PII will, 
of course, depend upon the specific needs and capabilities of each 
company.209  One necessary component, however, is increased 
involvement from corporate directors and officers.210  Increased board 
involvement in protecting customer information has been advocated on 
numerous fronts.  Federal banking agencies have promulgated guidelines 
                                                 
205 Id. 
206 IDENTITY THEFT RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 192, at 4, 13. 
207 See PONEMON INSTITUTE, LLC, 2007 ANNUAL STUDY, supra note 71, at 3. 
208 See Foley, supra note 12, at 19 (“The risks and threats from inadequate information 
technology and data security are real and significant.  They go to the heart of the 
company's existence and success and therefore demand careful attention from the board 
of directors and senior management.”). 
209 This article does not endeavor to provide broad based protection plans, but rather 
seeks to reinforce the magnitude of the PII issue and, concomitantly, the fact that the 
issue requires the attention and action of directors and executives. 
210 Foley, supra note 12, at 19 (“Boards need to focus on information technology matters 
more frequently and in greater depth than in the past.”). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology  Volume XV, Issue 4 
 
32 
that require directors to take an active role in protecting consumer 
information in the context of GLBA.211  Although these guidelines are 
directed to the financial sector, the basic principles are applicable across 
many industries.  In addition to the banking agencies, courts have 
acknowledged the role of directors in information security.212  Similar 
direction is emanating in the private sphere from business groups 
including the Business Roundtable and the Corporate Governance Task 
Force,213 as well as private practice attorneys.214 
 
[50]  The writing is on the wall: corporate protection of an individual’s PII 
creates revenue growth opportunities and the failure to do so creates 
financial liabilities.  Whether the directors and executives steering 
corporate America heed the growing calls to actively ensure that their 
companies protect PII will have a significant impact on not only the future 
of U.S. commerce, but also on the privacy of each citizen that takes part in 
electronic commerce.  This includes the directors and executives 
themselves, who are, after all, active participants in commerce.  The long 
corporate history of appropriate technological protection of financial 
assets provides corporations with a roadmap for the comparable treatment 
of PII.  Hopefully, America’s corporate leaders will read the writing on the 
wall and apply the knowledge and experience they have attained 
protecting financial assets to the protection of PII before it is too late, for 
commerce and for privacy. 
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